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1952 VIRGINIA LABOR LEGISLATION PROMPTED BY
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Virginia, along with other states, is involved in a struggle to
preserve a measure of her sovereignty in the regulation of labor
relations. Affirmative Congressional legislation in this field and
subsequent judicial interpretation denying concurrent activity to
the states have contracted the sphere of operation of local legislation
and increasingly restricted the exercise of the states' police power.
Historically, state legislatures have taken the lead in enacting
statutes relating to problems affecting labor and management.'
However, with the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act
(the Wagner Act) 2 in 1935, the Federal Government stepped into
the field of general regulation of labor disputes by restraining
management from interference with lawful union activity and pro-
viding machinery for the establishment of union contracts and
conciliation of disputes growing out of them. Initially, the courts
viewed this enactment as leaving open to the states concurrent
sovereignty in the field. In WLRB v. Fred Reuping Leather Co. 3
the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the entrance of the Federal
Government into the field of labor relations did not exclude the
states from operating in this field, since the source of the Govern-
ment's authority was the commerce power while that of the states
was their police power. The United States Supreme Court in
Allen-Bradley Local v. WERB4 . confirmed this theory, saying
that "Congress designedly left open an area for state control" and
that "the intention of Congress to exclude the State from exercising
their police power must be clearly manifested."
Following the passage of the Act, several states, assuming a
right of concurrent jurisdiction to exist; adopted similar protective
statutes in conformance with the act, Wisconsin being the first
(1937) to pass a "Baby Wagner Act."5 On the other hand many
states enacted restrictive statutes regulating labor relations. In
1945, in passing on the validity of such a restrictive statute, the
Supreme Court took a more limited view of the states' powers. The
1. E.g., NEw YoRK PEINAL CoDE § 171(a) (1887); MINN. R. L § 509.7
(1905); Mo. LAWS 1893 p. 187.
2. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1946).
3. 228 Wis. 773, 279 N.W. 673 (1938).
4. 315 U.S. 740, 750, 749 (1942).
5. Wis. STAT. § 111 (1937).
decision in Hill v. Florida6 qualified the language of the Allen.
Bradley case, indicating that where the Wagner Act had bestowed a
general right (in the instant case the freedom of employees to
choose their bargaining representatives) a state statute may not
limit it (by requiring a license.) A series of decisions placed further
limitations upon state regulation by judicial classification of certain
industries as "affecting commerce" within the meaning of the
Wagner Act, making it clear that federal labor legislation applies
even to privately owned public utilities operating wholly within
state boundaries. 7
The passage of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947
(Taft-Hartley Act) 8 extended the operation of the Wagner Act by
amendment to include the conduct of employees and unions as a
subject of regulation by the Federal Government. Where the Wag-
ner Act's primary function had been the protection of lawful union
activity, the Taft-Hartley Act restricted such activity. This law os-
tensibly returns to the states a portion of the power over labor dis-
putes which prior interpretation of the Wagner Act had lost to
them. Section 10 (a) provides for ceding jurisdiction of such dis-
putes to mediation boards established under state statutes when the
provisions of such statutes are not inconsistent with corresponding
provisions of the federal statute.
Virginia had, in 1947, enacted a Public Utilities Labor -Rela-
tions Law9 which provided, after reaffirming the right of collective
bargaining,'" that lockouts, strikes and work-stoppages were unlaw-
ful unless certain conditions were complied with. The statute set
forth a procedure for seizure by the Governor of a utility involved
in a labor dispute if, after a "cooling off" period, a strike seemed
imminent. 11 Public utilities occupy a unique position in the labor
picture. Clothed as they are with the public interest, any interrup-
tion in their operation will obviously affect the health and welfare of
the citizens served by them. Therefore Virginia had not been alone
in enacting, prior to the Taft-Hartley Act, legislation to promote
6. 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
7. E.g., NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941);
Pueblo Gas & Fuel Co. v. NLRB, 118 F.2d 304, 305, 306 (10th Cir.
1941); Consumers Power Co. v. NLRB, 113 F.2d 38, 39-41 (6th Cir.
1940).
8. 61 SrAT. 136 (1947); 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (Supp. 1946).
9. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 40-75 through 40-95 (1950).
10. VA. CODE ANN. § 40-76 (1950).
11. VA. CODE ANN. § 40-78 (1950).
prompt and efficient handling of labor disputes involving these
corporations, and to insure the continuous flow of their services if
free collective-bargaining should break down. 12 Wisconsin had
passed a statute known as the Public Utility Anti Strike Law.13 In
the debate on the passage of Wisconsin's legislation the Virginia
statute had been considered and certain of its provisions rejected
because it was shown that the unions had expressed their attitude
toward the Virginia act during a telephone strike in early 1947 by
prefacing their handling of calls with the operator's saying "due to
an unjust law, I am compelled to handle your call"; and manage-
ment spokesmen had been equally opposed to the law on the
grounds of its seizure provisions.14 The legislation finally enacted
by Wisconsin provided, in lieu of seizure, for compulsory arbitra-
tion of labor disputes in the event of an "impasse and stalemate" in
collective bargaining which was likely to result in an interruption
of an "essential public utility service." '15
But the general tenor and intent of the Wisconsin and Virginia
statutes is in accord. Therefore when the United States Supreme
Court, in Bus Employees v. Wisconsin Board,16 declared the
Wisconsin statute to be invalid as in conflict with the Taft-Hartley
Act, Virginia was alerted to amend her statute in order to bring
it into conformity with the federal law.
In the Wisconsin case, after reviewing the extent to which
Congress has acted in the regulation of peaceful strikes for higher
wages, the Court concluded that this field had been closed to state
regulation. It pointed out that public utilities fall under the opera-
tion of the Taft-Hartley Act, their special treatment having been
expressly rejected. Recalling that it had previously found invalid a
Michigan statute which sought to impose conditions on the right to
strike inconsistent with restriction in the limited sense imposed by
Congress in the Taft-Hartley Act, it held that the Wisconsin
statute, by making arbitration mandatory, sought to deny the right
entirely.
It was in an effort to resolve any inconsistencies with the
federal act, in the light of this decision, that the Virginia General
Assembly in the 1952 session enacted a new public utility labor
12. See Note, 1948 Wis. L. REV. 597.
.13. Wis. STAT. § 11.50 et seq. (1947).
14. See Note 1948 Wis. L. Rsv. 597.
15. Wis. STAT. § 111.50 (1947).
16. 340 U.S. 383 (1951).
relations law repealing the 1947 Act in toto and substituting new
provisions therefor (to be known as Code of Virginia (1950)
§§ 40-75.1 through § 40-75.6).17
Specifically the new act repeals §§ 40-76 and 40-77 of the Code
of Virginia, which deal with collective bargaining and lockouts in
public utilities, and § 40-78, which imposes conditions on the right
of employees of utilities to strike; provisions which-under the
language of the Wisconsin case-are in direct conflict with the
Taft-Hartley Act. The new sections relating to labor disputes in-
volving public utilities are carefully worded to avoid incompati-
bility with the Federal Act. § 40-75.1 designates the Department
of Labor and Industry as the authorized state agency to mediate
and conciliate labor disputes. § 40-75.2 provides for notice to the
Department of Labor and Industry of any anticipated termination
of a collective bargaining contract covering employees of any
utility "to which Federal legislation does not apply." § 40-75.3
directs the Commissioner of Labor to inform the Governor of the
nature of the dispute and provides that "if the Governor deems it
necessary the Commissioner, or his designated agent, shall offer to
meet and confer with the parties in interest and undertake to mediate
and conciliate their differences to the extent of the mediation and
conciliation by state agencies contemplated by the National Labor
Relations Act or siAilar Federal legislation. In the event Federal
Legislation does not apply, it shall be the duty of the utility and its
employees, or designated representatives, to meet and confer with
the Commissioner or his agent-for the purpose of mediating and
conciliating their differences." (Italics supplied.) Finally, § 40-75.4
charges the Commissioner with keeping the Governor fully informed
as to the progress of negotiations under the Act and to report the
probability of any strike or lockout. The concluding sections are
procedural only.
The language of these sections seems innocuous enough. The
Legislature has merely provided a means of mediation where one
does not otherwise exist, and made it possible for the Governor to
keep well informed regarding matters relating to the public interest.
The General Assembly, in this same session, however, enacted
another law which must be considered in conjunction with the above
legislation. This is a public utilities seizure act' 8 patterned after the
17. Acts of Assembly 1952, c. 697.
18. Acts of Assembly 1952, c. 696.
existing Ferry Seizure19 and Mine Seizure Acts.20 It provides that
"whenever in the judgment of the Governor there is an imminent
threat of substantial curtailment, interruption or suspension in the
operation of any public utility ... he shall promptly make an investi-
gation . . . " gives the Governor authority to take possession of the
utility where in his judgment such interruption of operation would
constitute a menace or threat to the public health, safety or welfare,
and sets forth the procedure for the seizure and operation of the
utility.
It is interesting to note how closely the sections of this act
parallel the sections of the companion act which this Legislature
deemed necessary to repeal. With the exception of former §§ 40-76,
40-77 and 40-78 (dealing with strikes and lockouts), the new
seizure act embodies all of the repealed sections. And the new law,
though apparently disinfected by the omission of any reference to
"labor disputes," "strikes," "lockouts" or "work-stoppages" as
incidents of interruption of public service warranting seizure, pre-
serves the controversial character of the legislation it displaced by
prohibiting picketing, once the State has taken possession, in the
broadest possible terms.
It is believed that the question remains whether Virginia has in
fact resolved the conflict between state and federal regulation of
labor relations, despite this artless dismemberment of the original
act. Although arbitration is not made mandatory in labor disputes
to which the Taft-Hartley Act is applicable, and labor disputes,
strikes, and lockouts are not specified as warranting seizure, the
conclusion seems inevitable that as a matter of practical application
of the legislation as a whole Virginia is seeking to continue the
curtailment of the right to strike by employees of public utilities.
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